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Defense Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance at
the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial by Failing
to Find Mitigating Evidence Contained in the
Defendant's Prior Conviction Record:
Rompilla v. Beard
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - The Supreme Court found that the as-

sistance rendered during the sentencing phase of the defendant's
capital trial fell below the standard of reasonable competence required by the Sixth Amendment when defense counsel failed to
find mitigating evidence contained in the defendant's prior conviction record.
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005).
Petitioner, Ronald Rompilla (hereinafter "Rompilla"), was convicted of first degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, for the brutal killing of James Scanlon.' During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution
sought the death penalty.2
The Commonwealth offered evidence of three aggravating factors to support a death sentence: (1) that the killing was perpetrated by torture; (2) that the murder was committed in the course
of another felony; and (3) that Rompilla had a record of significant
prior felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence.'
The testimony of Rompilla's family members, who appealed to residual doubt and pled for mercy, was the only mitigating evidence
presented by Rompilla's counsel.4 Assigning greater weight to the

1. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 653 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1995).
2. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (2005).
3. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2460. Rompilla had repeatedly stabbed Scanlon and set his
body on fire. Id. Rompilla murdered Scanlon in the victim's bar, the Cozy Corner Caf6,
located in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Id. He stole Scanlon's wallet and took between five
hundred and a thousand dollars from the bar. Id. Accordingly, Rompilla was convicted of
burglary, criminal trespass, robbery, theft and receiving stolen property, as well as first
degree murder. Rompilla, 653 A.2d at 629.
4. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2460.
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aggravating factors established by the prosecution, the jury sentenced Rompilla to death.5
After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal,' Rompilla retained new counsel and petitioned the Commonwealth for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act,7 asserting a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial
counsel in the sentencing phase.8 Rompilla's trial counsel knew
that, in order to prove Rompilla's criminal past and to emphasize
his violent character, the Commonwealth planned to introduce his
prior conviction for rape and assault and would specifically read
from the rape victim's earlier trial testimony.9 Nevertheless,
Rompilla's counsel failed to examine the court file on this prior
conviction.1° In this file were a number of possible mitigating factors, including evidence that Rompilla had been reared in slums
and abused as a child, had an IQ in the mentally retarded range,
was an alcoholic, and suffered from organic brain damage and
symptoms of schizophrenia." The postconviction court, applying
the test pronounced in Strickland v. Washington," nonetheless
determined that trial counsel had conducted a sufficient investigation in building the mitigation case." Relief was denied, and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial, upholding
the postconviction court's application of Strickland."
Rompilla next petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,"5 for a writ of habeas
corpus, again raising inadequate representation claims.16 The district court decided that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
vides:

Id. at 2461.
Rompilla, 653 A.2d 626.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 (2004).
Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
Id. at 2464.
Id.
Id. at 2468-69.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 721 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1998).
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).

This statute pro-

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
16. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
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unreasonable in its application of Strickland v. Washington' and
granted relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.'"
Finding that there were obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled
childhood, mental illness, and alcoholism that defense counsel had
failed to explore, the district court concluded that counsel was unjustified in relying on Rompilla's own account of an unremarkable
background. 9
A divided panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. °
The court noted that trial counsel had made efforts to discover
mitigating evidence by interviewing Rompilla and his family, and
by consulting three mental health experts.2 ' As these efforts gave
counsel no reason to believe further investigation would reveal
anything helpful, the court held that the attorneys were justified
in failing to go through additional records.2 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit concluded that there was nothing unreasonable about the state supreme court's application of Strickland and
reversed the district court's grant of relief.23 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari to address the standard of
reasonable competence required of Rompilla's defense counsel by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.24
Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court. 25 He stated that in order to receive federal habeas relief

Rompilla must show that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adjudication of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim "resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States."26 A state court is unreasonable in its application of federal law when it "identifies the correct

17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18. Romplla v. Horn, No. CIV.A.99-737, 2000 WL 964750 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
19. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
20. Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
21. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2461.
22. Id.
23. Horn, 355 F.3d at 233.
24. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2460. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2460 (Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
joined in the majority opinion written by Justice Souter; Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion; and Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.).
26. Id. at 2462 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
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governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [the] case."27
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that an
ineffective assistance claim is comprised of two elements: (1) deficient performance by counsel (2) which results in prejudice.2 8 Performance must be measured against an "objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."29 In Rompilla,
the Court explained that the sufficiency of the investigation undertaken by Rompilla's counsel must be evaluated according to
norms of "preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial,
when defense counsel's job is to counter the State's evidence of
aggravated culpability with evidence in mitigation." ° The advantages of hindsight must be discounted, and deference must be
given to counsel's judgments.3'
The Court recognized that Rompilla's counsel did not entirely
disregard their duty to find mitigating evidence, as they did interview Rompilla and members of his family and review the reports
given by the mental health experts who had testified at trial.3 2
These sources produced no helpful information.33 However, the
Court also noted a number of promising avenues unexplored by
the defense lawyers, including school records, records of Rompilla's juvenile and adult incarcerations, and a closer look at Rompilla's history of alcohol dependence.34 In response, the Commonwealth argued that "the duty to investigate does not force defense
lawyers to scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn
up; [and] reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they
have good reason to think further investigation would be a
waste."3 5 The Court conceded that whether counsel was obligated

27. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)).
28. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
29. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
30. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
31. Id. See also Strickland,466 U.S. at 689-91.
32. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
33. Id. Rompilla himself was uninterested in helping and even sent counsel off on false
leads. Id. When asked about his childhood and schooling, he answered that except for the
fact that he had quit school in ninth grade, they had been normal. Id. Family members
admitted that they did not know Rompilla very well because he had spent most of his adult
life and some of his childhood in custody. Id. at 2463. The three mental health witnesses
had been retained during the guilt phase to evaluate Rompilla's mental state at the time of
the crime and to assess his competency to stand trial, but counsel found nothing useful as
mitigation in their reports. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2462.
34. Id. at 2463.
35. Id.
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to pursue any of these other sources was arguable.3 6 However, the
Court found that, in failing to examine the court file on Rompilla's
prior rape and assault conviction, defense counsel was clearly deficient.37
Defense counsel knew that the Commonwealth planned to support its request for a death sentence by introducing Rompilla's
rape and assault conviction and reading his prior victim's testimony of his violent character.38 Yet, Rompilla's attorneys did not
obtain the file until the day before the sentencing hearing, when
the prosecutor warned counsel for a second time of his intention to
use the prior conviction case and victim transcript.39 The Court
stated that the defense had "a duty to make all reasonable efforts
to learn what they could" about the prosecution's case for aggravation, and "reasonable efforts certainly included obtaining the
Commonwealth's own readily available file on the prior conviction," which was to constitute the centerpiece of the prosecution's
case.4 ° In further support of this contention, the Court referred to
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice,4
which have long been a guide for the Court in determining what is
reasonable.42
The Commonwealth argued that the efforts defense counsel
made to find mitigating evidence from other sources excused them
from looking at the file of this prior conviction. 3 The Court, however, held that "it flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer
should try to look at a file he knows the prosecution will cull for
aggravating evidence, let alone when the file is sitting in the trial
courthouse, open for the asking." As such, the Court concluded

36. Id.
37. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2463.
38. Id. at 2464.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2465.
41. Id. at 2465-66. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice in effect at the time Rompilla was on trial provided, in relevant part:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to ...
the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should always include
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and . .. [tihe
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements
to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt ....
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (2d ed. & 1982 Supp.) (emphasis added).
42. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2466.
43. Id. at 2466-67.
44. Id. at 2467.
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that the performance of defense counsel was deficient and that the
state court had come to an objectively unreasonable conclusion.45
Having determined that the performance of Rompilla's counsel
was deficient, the Court turned to the second prong of the Strickland test, considering whether this deficient performance resulted
in prejudice." Prejudice has resulted when "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."47 The majority concluded that the deficient performance of Rompilla's counsel was
clearly prejudicial as the neglected prior conviction file contained
a number of untapped mitigation leads.48
The file contained an evaluation by a corrections counselor,
which revealed that Rompilla was reared in the slums, had quit
school at age sixteen, and had been in and out of jail from an early
age.49 Also in the same file were test results showing that Rompilla had a third grade level of cognition and symptoms of schizophrenia and other disorders. 0 The Court argued that these findings would have prompted further investigation and likely would
have revealed much of the information discovered by postconviction counsel.51 The Court concluded that all this evidence "add[ed]

45. Id.
46. Id. at 2467.
47. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)).
48. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2468-69. From testimony of family members, whom Rompilla's trial counsel
had not interviewed, postconviction counsel found that:
Rompilla's parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly. His
mother drank during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers
eventually developed serious drinking problems. His father, who had a vicious
temper, frequently beat Rompilla's mother, leaving her bruised and black-eyed,
and bragged about his cheating on her. His parents fought violently, and on at
least one occasion his mother stabbed his father. He was abused by his father
who beat him when he was young with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts
and sticks. All of the children lived in terror. There were no expressions of parental love, affection or approval. Instead, he was subjected to yelling and verbal abuse. His father locked Rompilla and his brother Richard in a small wire
mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled. He had an isolated background, and was not allowed to visit other children or to speak to anyone on the
phone. They had no indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no
heat, and the children were not given clothes and attended school in rags.
Id. (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 279 (3d Cir. 2004) (Sloviter, J., dissenting)).
Tests conducted by postconviction counsel also showed that Rompilla 'suffers from organic
brain damage, an extreme mental disturbance significantly impairing several of his cognitive functions," and that "Rompilla's problems relate back to childhood, and were likely
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up to a mitigation case that [bore] no relation to the few naked
pleas for mercy actually put before the jury . . . [and] the undis-

covered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have
influenced the jury's appraisal of Rompilla's culpability."" The
Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit, and ordered that Pennsylvania either retry the case on penalty or stipulate to a life sentence.53
Justice O'Connor, who joined in the majority opinion, wrote a
separate concurrence to address the claim of the dissent that this
decision imposed a rigid requirement on defense attorneys to inspect the case file of any prior conviction the prosecution might
use at trial.' Justice O'Connor contended, however, that no mechanical rule was promulgated by the Court's decision; rather, the
decision was a product of the Court's "longstanding case-by-case
approach" to evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of an attorney's performance.55 It was upon consideration of all the circumstances56 that the Court determined that the failure to examine
the prior conviction file was unreasonable in this case.57
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas, dissented." They insisted that the
majority opinion imposed a per se rule and ignored the deference
owed to counsel's decisions, as well as the Court's own past warnings "against the creation of 'specific guidelines' or 'checklist [s] for
judicial evaluation of attorney performance. " "
The dissent argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
not objectively unreasonable in finding Rompilla's representation
to be adequate." Rompilla's counsel, Justice Kennedy said, knew
enough about his prior conviction to decide that reviewing the case

caused by fetal alcohol syndrome...." Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Rompilla, 355
F.3d at 280 (Sloviter, J., dissenting)).
52. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2469.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2469 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2470. Justice O'Connor listed three specific circumstances making counsel's
failure unreasonable: (1) defense counsel was on notice that the prior conviction would
constitute the heart of the prosecution's argument; (2) the prior conviction was of a similar
crime and threatened the defense's appeal to residual doubt; and (3) failure to examine the
file was not a tactical decision made because the file was inaccessible or inordinately large,
or in order to spend time following other leads. Id. at 2470-71.
57. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2470-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2471-73 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
60. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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file would be a waste of their time.6 ' The majority argued that the
entire file could be reviewed with ease, but the dissent contended
that the record lent no support to this assumption.6 2 Justice Kennedy argued that if counsel had hoped to discover details about
Rompilla's mental condition and upbringing, they were more
likely to get this type of information from the very sources they
tapped - Rompilla himself, his family, and the three mental
health experts.6 3
Justice Kennedy went on to argue that, even assuming that
counsel was deficient in failing to review the conviction file, Rompilla was still not entitled to habeas relief because "[tihe Court's
theory of prejudice rests on serendipity."' The majority held that
without the mitigating evidence discovered by postconviction
counsel, Rompilla's sentence was prejudiced.6 5 Justice Kennedy
explained, however, that postconviction counsel found leads to this
mitigating evidence only in an "Initial Transfer Petition" that had
been prepared by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
and happened to be included in the conviction file.66 The dissent
argued that Rompilla could not establish prejudice because even if
counsel had reviewed the case file, as the majority believed they
should have, "there would have been no reason for counsel to read,
or even to skim, this obscure document." 7 Justice Kennedy concluded the dissent by asserting that the Court's analysis was
clouded by hindsight and, as a result, the majority imposed a rigid
requirement on defense attorneys that is supported by neither
case law nor common sense.'
A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel has
been an essential principle of criminal justice in the United States
since colonial times.69 The Sixth Amendment guarantee that the
61. Id. at 2474. Defense counsel knew that Rompilla had been convicted of breaking
into the apartment of bar owner Josephine Macrenna. Id. After taking the bar's receipts,
he demanded that she undress. Id. Ms. Macrenna initially resisted, and Rompilla slashed
her breast with a knife and proceeded to rape her at knifepoint for over an hour. Id.
"[Q]uibbling with the Commonwealth's version of events was a dubious trial strategy," and,
instead, '[trial counsel] fought vigorously to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing
the details." Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2474 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2475.
63. Id. at 2474.
64. Id. at 2476.
65. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
66. Id. at 2476-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2478.
69. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-65 (1932).
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criminally accused "shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"71 is a safeguard "necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty."71 In 1932, the
Supreme Court decided that three criminal defendants were denied this constitutional right in Powell v. Alabama.7 2
The defendants in Powell, three young, ignorant, illiterate,
black boys, were charged with the rape of two white girls, convicted, and sentenced to death.73 As residents of other states with
no family or friends in Alabama, the defendants were not asked
whether they had or could hire counsel, whether they wanted to
have counsel appointed, or whether they wished to communicate
with friends or family for assistance. 4
The trial judge had appointed "all the members of the bar" for
the "purpose of arraigning the defendants," and anticipated or
hoped that one of them would continue to represent the boys at
trial if no one else appeared on their behalf.75 At the commencement of trial, however, there was no one to answer for the defendants, and no particular lawyer had been named to represent
them." A Tennessee lawyer named Roddy addressed the trial
court, explaining that he had been sent from Chattanooga by parties interested in the defendants, but that "'the boys would be better off if [he stepped] entirely out the of case'" because he was in
no way prepared to defend them and was unfamiliar with Alabama procedure.7 7 A member of the Alabama bar named Moody
then offered to "'go go ahead and help Mr. Roddy in anything [he
could] do about it,'" and the trial judge, thus satisfied, proceeded
with the trial.8
The Supreme Court stated that the defendants were presumed
innocent until convicted, and "it was the duty of the court having
their cases in charge to see that they were denied no necessary
incident of a fair trial," including the assistance of counsel. 79 The
trial judge's appointment of "the members of the bar" was merely
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
U.S. 335 (1963).
72. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
73. Id. at 49-52.
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Powell, 297 U.S. at 55.
78. Id. at 56.
79. Id. at 52.

See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
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"an expansive gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligation upon any one."" Mr. Roddy, charged with responsibility on
the morning of trial, was given no opportunity to investigate or
prepare a defense."' The Supreme Court reasoned that, under
these circumstances, the appearance of counsel was "rather pro
forma than zealous and active," and ruled that "defendants were
not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense."8 2
In subsequent decisions, the Court dealt with other situations in
which there was actual or constructive denial of assistance altogether.3 In 1984, Strickland v. Washington' presented the first
opportunity for the Court to directly address a claim that counsel's
assistance, though actually rendered, was unconstitutionally ineffective." To evaluate such a claim, the Court first had to define
the standard of reasonable competence required of defense counsel
by the Sixth Amendment.86 At the time Strickland reached the
Supreme Court, all of the circuit courts of appeal, with one exception, had adopted some sort of "reasonable competence" standard
of effectiveness.8 7 However, the way in which the standard was
applied varied dramatically." At the time of Strickland's writ of
certiorari, the Attorneys General of forty-two states urged as
amici curiae that "there [was] a vital and immediate need for [the
Supreme] Court to resolve the conflicts that presently [existed]
among the states and the federal circuits and establish guidelines
by which courts [could]89 begin to analyze these claims with a
measure of consistency."
In Strickland, the defendant, Washington, had planned and
committed a number of violent crimes, including three capital
murders. 0 He pled guilty to all charges.9 The trial judge stated
that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to
80. Id. at 56.
81. Id. at 58.
82. Powell, 297 U.S. at 58.
83. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (an actual conflict of interest may so
adversely affect counsel's performance as to constructively deny assistance); Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (state statute constructively denied assistance of counsel by
authorizing trial judge to prevent counsel from making a closing argument).
84. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683.
86. Id. at 671.
87. Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curia Supporting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 3, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554).
88. Brief for the State of Alabama et al., supra note 87, at 3.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671-72.
91. Id. at 672.

Winter 2006

Rompilla v. Beard

373

step forward and admit their responsibility," but also added that
this was to say nothing about the sentencing decision he would
make." In his plea colloquy, Washington told the judge that "he
had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his
criminal spree he was under extreme stress."9 3 Washington then,
against the advice of his counsel, opted to be sentenced by the trial
judge without jury recommendation.94 The judge found as aggravating factors that all three murders were "especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel ...

were committed in the course of at least

one other dangerous and violent felony... were for pecuniary gain

S. . [and] were committed to avoid arrest."95 Regarding mitigating

factors, the judge found that Washington was not suffering from
extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the commission
of the crimes and that "even if respondent had no significant history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances 'Would
still clearly far outweigh' that mitigating factor."96 Thus, the trial
judge sentenced Washington to death.97
After being denied collateral relief at the state level, Washington petitioned federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." His request for relief included a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing phase.99 The District Court for the Southern
District of Florida denied relief, concluding that although counsel's
failure to further investigate certain mitigating evidence reflected
an error in judgment, no prejudice to Washington's sentence resulted." Using its own method to analyze the claim, the Court of
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
Appeals
0
court.'1
On appeal, the Supreme Court began by recognizing that the
purpose of the right to assistance of counsel is to ensure the accused a fair trial.0 2 With this purpose in mind, the Court stated
that "the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674. The murders involved repeated stabbings and were
committed in the course of robberies. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 675.
98. Id. at 678.
99. Id. at 675.
100. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678-79.
101. Id. at 679.
102. Id. at 686.
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ing of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." °3 The Court concluded that a successful claim for relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel
must contain two required elements." "First, the defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient,

. .

. [and] [siecond,

the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." °5
Regarding the first element, the Strickland Court explained
that performance is deficient when it falls below an "objective
standard of reasonableness" as determined by "prevailing professional norms.""° The Court emphasized that "more specific guidelines are not appropriate." 7 Noting the language of the Sixth
Amendment, which refers simply to "counsel" without specifying
precise requirements, the Court explained that "no particular set
of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant."1 8
The Court stated that a defendant making a claim of ineffective
assistance must specifically point to those acts or omissions that
he claims were not products of "reasonable professional judgment.""° The Court directed that counsel's challenged conduct
must be judged on the facts of the particular case as they existed
at the time of the acts or omissions."0 Thus freed from the "distorting effects of hindsight," a court must then determine whether
counsel's conduct was within the "wide range of professionally
competent assistance.""'
Regarding counsel's choices, the Court stated that "strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts rele-

103. Id. The Court reasoned that "a capital sentencing proceeding... is sufficiently like
a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's
role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial." Id. at 686-87. See also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 687-88.
107. Id. at 688.
108. Id. at 688-89.
109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See also Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955)
(There is a presumption of effective assistance, and defendant bears the burden of proving
inadequacy).
110. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
111. Id. at 690.
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Furvant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable."
ther, the Court explained that the reasonableness of counsel's actions will often be influenced by the statements or actions of his
client."' "When a defendant has given counsel reason to believe
that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even
harmful," the Court said, "counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." 4
Moving on to the prejudice element of the claim, the Strickland
Court first recognized that there are certain contexts in which
prejudice is presumed to result from a Sixth Amendment violation. 15 Such circumstances have included cases where assistance
of counsel was denied entirely, where the government interfered
with counsel's assistance, and where counsel represented conflicting interests.1 16 However, the Court decided that when asserting a
claim that counsel's assistance was not denied altogether, but
rather was deficient or ineffective, a defendant must affirmatively
prove prejudice.1 7 The Court said it is insufficient to show that
counsel's shortcomings had some conceivable impact on the outcome." 8 Rather, the Court required that "the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."" 9
The Court then applied its newly stated principles to the facts of
Washington's case. 20 In preparation for sentencing, Washington's
counsel spoke with the defendant, his wife, and his mother about
Washington's background, but he did not search for other character witnesses or seek a psychiatric examination, and he did not
request that a pre-sentence report be made.'2 ' Counsel argued at
the sentencing hearing that Washington should be spared because
he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the
time of the crimes and had taken responsibility, confessed, and
shown remorse.'2 2 The prosecution presented evidence mainly to
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
(1975);
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335 (1980); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 672-73.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 673-74.
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describe the details of the crimes and the manner of death of
Washington's victims, and defense counsel did not cross-examine
the government's medical experts.123
Washington claimed that counsel was inadequate in numerous
respects.124 However, the Supreme Court denied relief, finding
that counsel's strategy was the result of professionally reasonable
judgment."' The Court said counsel could reasonably conclude
from his conversations with Washington that further character
and psychological evidence would not be helpful."6 Also, the Court
noted that by restricting character testimony to what had been
entered at the plea colloquy, counsel foreclosed the prosecution
from entering contrary character and psychological evidence, and
kept out Washington's prior record, which counsel had successfully moved to exclude.2 7
Further, the Court concluded that Washington could not show
that any acts or omissions on the part of counsel resulted in unfair
prejudice.2 8 In support of his claim, Washington presented affidavits from acquaintances who would have been willing to testify on
his behalf and a psychiatric report and psychological report stating that Washington, "though not under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance, was 'chronically frustrated and
depressed because of his economic dilemma' at the time of his
crimes."" Considering that the trial judge had found overwhelming aggravating factors, the Court concluded "there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the
conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed." 30
Thus, the Supreme Court denied Washington's request for habeas
relief.131

123. Id. at 674.
124. Id. at 675. Washington claimed that his trial counsel was deficient because "he
failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report,
to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report,
to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical
examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts." Id.
125. Id. at 699-700.
126. Id. at 699.
127. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699.
128. Id. at 699-700.
129. Id. at 675-76.
130. Id. at 700.
131. Id. at 701.
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The Court was faced with another claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel during sentencing in Williams v. Taylor.'32 After the
Virginia Supreme Court rejected his claim, Williams petitioned for
federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.'
Before
turning to the merits of the claim, the United States Supreme
Court first had to address how its authority to grant federal habeas relief had been affected by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1966 (AEDPA), which amended the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act."' The Court asserted that, as
amended, the statute dictated that state court decisions may be
challenged only against "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," and relief may only be granted
where the decision of the state tribunal was "contrary
to, or in135
volved an unreasonable application of' that law.
The Court explained that "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court" referred to the precedent established by the Supreme Court's holdings at the time of the state
court decision at issue.3 6 Further, the Court emphasized that for
the purposes of this statute, a rule of law may be adequately clear
even when expressed as a generalized standard, as opposed to a
bright-line rule." 7 The Court found that Williams' claim met this
AEDPA threshold question as its merits were squarely governed
by the Court's holding in Strickland.13 Thus, Williams would be
entitled to relief if the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection of his
claim was contrary to or resulted
from an unreasonable applica39
tion of the Strickland standard.

Williams, while incarcerated for another offense, wrote a letter
to the police confessing responsibility for a killing that had oc-

132. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
133. Williams, 529 U.S. at 372.
134. Id. at 375-90. The relevant part of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, as
amended, is contained in § 2254(d)(1), which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
135. Williams, 529 U.S. at 379.
136. Id. at 381.
137. Id. at 382.
138. Id. at 390.
139. Id. at 379.
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curred six months earlier.1 41 Within a few months, Williams was
convicted of robbery and capital murder.'
At sentencing, Williams' counsel emphasized the fact that he had turned himself in
and initiated the contact with the police, but admitted that it was
"'very difficult to ask [the jury] to show mercy to a man who
maybe had not shown much mercy himself."' 4 ' The jury, finding a

"probability of future dangerousness," recommended a death sentence.'43
In support of his claim that counsel was ineffective at sentencing, Williams argued that his juvenile and social services records,
undiscovered by counsel, revealed a plethora of mitigating evidence that the jury never heard.'" Trial counsel admitted that his
failure to seek Williams' juvenile and social services records was
not based on a strategic decision that such records would not be
helpful, but rather was based on his erroneous belief that state
law did not permit it.' 4 ' The Court thus found that trial counsel

was deficient in failing to
conduct a thorough investigation of the
14
defendant's background.

The Court criticized the Virginia Supreme Court's evaluation of
the prejudice element, asserting that the state court failed to consider the totality of the mitigation evidence available and reweigh
it against the evidence in aggravation. 47 The Court concluded
that, had trial counsel's argument been augmented by the compelling evidence of the abuse and neglect suffered by Williams
throughout his childhood, it "might well have influenced the jury's
appraisal of his moral culpability."'48 Thus, the Court concluded
that "the Virginia Supreme Court rendered a 'decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

140. Williams, 529 U.S. at 367. Stone was found dead at his home, and the police, finding no evidence of a struggle, concluded that the cause of death was blood alcohol poisoning,
and considered the case closed. Id.
141. Id. at 368.
142. Id. at 369 n.2.
143. Id. at 370.
144. Id. at 370-71. Documents related to Williams' commitment at age eleven described
an early childhood rife with abuse and neglect, and contained evidence that he was borderline mentally retarded, had suffered numerous head injuries, and suffered from organic
brain impairments. Id. The habeas hearing also revealed that the State's own experts
believed that Williams would not be dangerous if kept in a "structured environment." Id.
145. Williams, 529 U.S. at 373.
146. Id. at 396.
147. Id. at 397-98.
148. Id. at 398.
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established Federal law'. . . and Williams' constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel ... was violated."49

In 2003, the Court decided Wiggins v. Smith,"' applying the
Strickland standard to yet another set of facts and further expounding the meaning of the 1996 amendments to § 2254."' Clarifying its discussion of the AEDPA in Williams, the Court stated
that habeas relief may be granted under § 2254(d)(1) if the state
court has used the correct legal principle, but has unreasonably
applied that principle to the facts of the case.'52 Further, the Court
said, "in order for a federal court to find a state court's application
of our precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must
have been more than incorrect or erroneous .

.

. [it] must have

unreasonable.'"' 53

been 'objectively
Wiggins complained that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and offer evidence at sentencing of his severely dysfunctional background." Defense counsel knew from Wiggins' written
presentence investigation (PSI), which included a one-page personal history of the defendant, that Wiggins described his own
background as "disgusting" and had spent most of his life in foster
care.'
Counsel acquired records of his placements in the foster
care system from the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS)."' However, the PSI and DSS records were apparently
the only two sources of background information used by counsel."7
149. Id. at 399.
150. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
151. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21.
152. Id. at 520.
153. Id. at 520-21 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
154. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516. In support of his claim, Wiggins presented a report by a
licensed social worker, who had used state social services, school and medical records, along
with interviews with Wiggins and many family members, to outline his miserable life history. Id. at 516-17. Quoting the report, the Court said:
Petitioner's mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings
home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and
garbage. Mrs. Wiggins' abusive behavior included beating the children for
breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked. She had sex with men
while her children slept in the same bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner's hand against a hot stove burner... At the age of six, the State placed
Wiggins in foster care ... [where his] first and second foster mothers abused
him physically, and . . . the father in his second foster home repeatedly molested and raped him. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and
began living on the streets.
Id.
155. Id. at 523.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 523-24.
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In Wiggins, the Court found that counsel's failure to expand
their search despite the significant leads discovered in the PSI
and DSS records was deficient under the professional standards
that prevailed in the jurisdiction at the time. 158 Considering the
nature and the extent of the abuse suffered by Wiggins, the Court
concluded that "had the jury been confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable 159
probability that it
sentence."
different
a
with
returned
have
would
These attempts of the Court to elucidate and apply a standard
for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims raise various issues and implicate competing concerns. Perhaps most flagrant are the difficulties associated with applying the vague, general rule outlined in Strickland. This problem is evident from the
number of cases in which the district court's decision was reversed
by the circuit court, which was in turn reversed by the Supreme
Court. 6 ' The Srickland test declares that counsel has rendered
ineffective assistance when counsel's performance is deficient and
when that deficiency results in prejudice. 6 ' However, this seemingly straightforward, two-prong test has meaning only to the extent that "deficient" and "prejudice" are given meaning. Explaining that sufficiency of performance should be measured against an
"objective standard of reasonableness" in light of prevailing professional norms... offers little help. Saying that prejudice turns on
whether there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would
have been different absent counsel's errors 6 3 is no more helpful.
Despite its use of words like "objective" and "reasonable," as Justice Marshall said in Strickland, "in essence, the majority has instructed judges.. . to avert to their own intuitions ...."1
Further muddling the issue is the standard of review incorporated in the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act.'65 The Court
has construed this statute to require that a state court's decision
may be overturned only when that court has been "objectively
158. Id. at 524. Preparation of a social history report in capital cases was standard
practice in Maryland where Wiggins went to trial. Id. The Public Defender's office regularly provided funds to retain a forensic social worker for such purposes. Id. Nevertheless,
defense counsel chose not to commission a report. Id.
159. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-37.
160. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510; Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
161. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
162. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
163. Id. at 694.
164. Id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. 28 U.S.C § 2254 (1996).
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unreasonable" in its application of the Strickland test.166 Thus,
federal courts dealing with habeas corpus claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel are given the unintelligible task of determining whether a state court was "objectively unreasonable" in
its application of a two-prong test, which, at its core, seems to ultimately appeal to intuitions.
In Strickland, Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion
that many aspects of criminal defense are "amenable to judicial
oversight... [and] could profitably be made the subject of uniform
standards."'6 7 The majority, however, refused to start down a path
toward detailed guidelines or checklists and instead emphasized
the importance of reviewing counsel's decisions with deference."
Justice O'Connor astutely recognized that "representation is an
art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may
be sound or even brilliant in another."169 Further, there are serious concerns of how intense scrutiny and mechanical requirements would affect the integrity of the criminal justice system and
the legal profession.17 If intrusive post-trial inquiry were available, ineffectiveness claims would be encouraged and the finality
of criminal adjudications eroded. 7' In turn, the increased possibility of post-conviction criticism and reversal may "dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage
the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client." 72
These legitimate concerns have prevented the Court from delineating more particularized or clear-cut standards. Instead, the
Strickland analysis continues to be used on a case-by-case basis to
assess the reasonableness of counsel's actions and omissions under given circumstances. Considering the various interests in tension discussed above, perhaps this is the best approach after all.
The Strickland analysis affords courts a great deal of flexibility,
allowing judges to consider the whole scenario and factor in its
subtleties in a way that adherence to mechanical rules would not
permit. Some degree of clarity and uniformity may be sacrificed.

166. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 409 (2000)).
167. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 690 (majority opinion).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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However, where questions of fundamental fairness are at issue,
intuition is sometimes the keenest sense.
April Trimble

